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Roach et al.: Business Law

BUSINESS LAW
I.

LENDER HAS STANDING TO SUE ON MOBILE HoME DEALER'S

STATUTORY BOND

In Action Mortgage Corp. v. Van Deusen1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a lending institution may maintain an action against a surety on the statutory bond required of
a licensed manufactured home dealer. 2 Action Mortgage demonstrates the court's continued willingness to expand standing to
sue the surety of the statutory bond required of certain licensed
occupational groups.3
Van Deusen was a licensed manufactured home dealer doing
business as Greater Greenville Homes.4 Pursuant to a dealer
agreement, Action Mortgage Corporation financed Van Deusen's
sale of a mobile home 5 to Samuel Mobley. Van Deusen misrepre-

sented the length of the mobile home to Mobley and Action
Mortgage. When Mobley discovered the misrepresentation, he
sued Van Deusen, Greater Greenville Homes, and Action Mortgage. Mobley obtained a default judgment against Action Mortgage in which the trial judge ordered Action Mortgage to reduce
Mobley's debt on the mobile home by $5,000.6 Action Mortgage
then instituted this action against Van Deusen, Greater Greenville Homes, and Sentry Indemnity Company. Sentry Indemnity
was joined in this action as the surety on the bond required of
Van Deusen and Greater Greenville Homes by section 31-17-110
of the South Carolina Code.' The trial judge granted Sentry In1. 291 S.C. 208, 352 S.E.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. Id. at 213, 352 S.E.2d at 714.
3. In Watson v. Harmon, 280 S.C. 214, 312 S.E.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1984), the court
held that a homeowner could maintain an action on the statutory bond required of a
licensed home builder.
4. Greater Greenville Homes failed to renew its license on July 1, 1984.
5. A "manufactured home" is a "mobile home." S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-17-20(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987).
6. Van Deusen and Greater Greenville Homes were never served. Brief of Appellant at 2.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-17-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) provides in part:
All licensees for a manufactured housing license shall ... furnish a corporate
surety bond in the sum of ten thousand dollars. The bond shall provide against
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demnity's motion for involuntary nonsuit solely on the ground
that Action Mortgage lacked standing to sue on the statutory
bond."
The court of appeals rejected the lower court's opinion that
standing to maintain an action on the statutory bond was limited to "the consumer, to the person who buys the home." 9 The
court reached its decision by applying the two-tiered test of
Watson v. Harmon. 0 In applying the first tier of the test, the
court analyzed the purpose of the applicable statute" and implementing regulations 12 that require the bond. In doing so, the
court gave great weight to the language of the regulations
adopted by the South Carolina Manufactured Housing Board. 3
These regulations require that the manufactured home dealer's
bond be "in favor of any person who shall suffer any loss as a
result of any violation of the conditions herein contained."' 4 The
term "person" is defined in the regulations to mean "every natural person, firm, partnership or corporation."'15 Consequently,
the court found that the bond required by section 31-17-110 protects not only purchasers but also "any person," including a
lending institution, who suffers a loss due to a manufactured
home dealer's noncompliance with the statute.
In applying the second tier of the test, the court of appeals
had to determine whether a member of the protected class may
maintain an action on the bond required by section 31-17-110.

any misappropriation of funds belonging to the purchaser, any alteration on
the part of the salesman to deceive the purchaser as to the manufacture or
construction of the product or any false and fraudulent representations or de-

ceitful practices in selling or representing a product and any failure to fulfill
warranty obligations.
8. Action Mortgage recovered a jury verdict against Van Deusen and Greater
Greenville Homes in the amount of $5,000. The sole subject of the appeal by Action
Mortgage is the trial court's granting Sentry Indemnity's motion for involuntary nonsuit.
9. 291 S.C. at 210, 352 S.E.2d at 713.
10. 280 S.C. 214, 312 S.E.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1984).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-18-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
12. S.C. CODE REGS. 19-425.4 (1976).
13. S.C, CODE REGS. 19-425.4 (1976), arguably, expands the purpose of § 31-17-110.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held, however, that "the construction of a statute by an agency charged with its administration is entitled to the most respectful con-

sideration and should not be overruled absent compelling reasons." Emerson Elec. Co. v.
Wasson, 287 S.C. 394, 397, 339 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1986) (citations omitted). The court of
appeals did not address this issue.
14. S.C. CODE REGS. 19-425.4 (1976).
15. Id. at 19-425.1(H).
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The court determined that since there is no clear statutory language to the contrary, Action Mortgage, as a beneficiary of the
bond, had standing to maintain an action on the bond.1"
Other jurisdictions considering the issue raised in Action
Mortgage have reached conflicting results. These results, however, may be reconciled by comparing the statutory language on
which they were based. For example, the court of appeals supported its opinion by citing cases decided under Florida and
North Dakota licensing statutes.17 Both statutes require the
dealer's bond to indemnify "any person."' 8 Additionally, both
jurisdictions construed the term "any person" to include a lending institution and, therefore, allowed the lending institution to
sue under the dealer's bond.' Likewise, the South Carolina
Manufactured Housing Board's regulations require that the
dealer's bond be in favor of "any person."20
The court of appeals noted a different result reached under
Iowa law.2 ' The Iowa licensing statute provides that the dealer's
bond shall indemnify "any person who buys a motor vehicle
from the dealer.

' 22

The Iowa court construed the statute to pro-

tect only purchasers, not lenders.23 One can reconcile the Iowa
holding and Action Mortgage by comparing the language of the
Iowa statute with that of the South Carolina Manufactured
Housing Board's regulation. The Iowa statute limits bond protection to "any person who buys a motor vehicle"; 24 on the other

hand, the South Carolina regulation provides bond protection to
' 25
"any person.

16. 291 S.C. at 213, 352 S.E.2d at 714.
17. Interstate See. v. Hamrick's Auto Sales, 238 So. 2d 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970); Ramsey Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Suburban Sales & Serv., 231 N.W.2d 732 (N.D.
1975).
18. The applicable Florida statute requires that the dealer's bond be "in favor of
any person in a retail or wholesale transaction." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.27(10) (West
1986). The applicable North Dakota statute requires that the dealer's bond indemnify
"any person dealing or transacting business with said dealer." N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-3305 (1987).
19. State v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 179 N.W.2d 123, 127 (N.D. 1970); Interstate
Sec., 238 So. 2d at 484.
20. S.C. CODE REGS. 19-425.4 (1976).

21. Boone State Bank & Trust Co. v. Westfield Ins., 298 N.W.2d 315 (Iowa 1980).
22. IOWA CODE ANN. § 322.4(7) (West 1985).
23. 298 N.W.2d at 318.
24. IOWA CODE ANN. § 322.4(7) (West 1985).
25. S.C. CODE REGS. 19-425.4 (1976).
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The cases cited by the court of appeals deal with bonds required for the licensing of motor vehicles. s6 South Carolina also
requires, as a prerequisite to licensure, that motor vehicle dealers furnish a surety bond.2 7 The bond must provide indemnification for "any loss or damage suffered by an owner of a motor
vehicle. '28 The statute further states that "[a]n owner . . . who
suffers the loss or damage has a right of action against. . . the
dealer's . . . surety upon the bond. '29 This statute appears to

limit standing for maintaining a cause of action to the "owner of
a motor vehicle." As a result, lenders who, pursuant to dealer
plans, finance the sale of motor vehicles may not have the same
protection granted lenders who finance the sale of mobile homes.
Action Mortgage allows a lending institution to maintain an
action against a surety on the statutory bond required of a licensed manufactured home dealer. This holding provides protection to innocent lenders who suffer loss because of statutory
noncompliance by a manufactured home dealer. Accordingly, the
South Carolina Legislature should extend this protection to
lenders who finance motor vehicles."'
Sharon S. Roach
II. SCOPE OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT NARROWED
In Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co.3 1 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer's inequitable termination of a dealer for selling a competing product
does not violate South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act
26. See cases cited supra notes 17 and 21.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-320 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Other legislatures have recognized the restrictive meaning of the word "purchaser" in statutes requiring motor vehicle dealer bonds. The Florida legislature
amended its statute which required that the dealer's bond be in favor of "any purchaser"
to read "any person." See Barnett First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 221 So. 2d
11, 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In 1966 the Michigan legislature expanded bond protection from "any purchaser" to "any purchaser, seller, financing agency." See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 257.248(g) (1977). On the other hand, the Washington legislature, in 1961,
amended its statute to provide that only a "retail purchaser" rather than "any person"
could maintain an action against the surety of the dealer's bond. See Home Indem. Co.
v. McClellan Motors, 77 Wash. 2d 1, 3, 459 P.2d 389, 391 (Wash. 1969).
31. 810 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 94 (1987).
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(UTPA)32 when the dealer can neither sustain a common law
wrongful termination claim nor prove that the manufacturer's
action is an anticompetitive practice.33 The court implicitly narrowed the unfair or deceptive practices prong of the UTPA34 by
holding that the UTPA does not extend to facts that would not
35
support a wrongful termination claim.

From 1975 through 1982, the plaintiff, Chuck's Feed and
Seed Company, a retail feed store owned by Charles Lambert,
was a dealer for the defendant, Ralston Purina Company. By
virtue of his dealership arrangement, Lambert was entitled to
purchase feed directly from Purina. Purina promised Lambert
that no other Purina dealerships would be established within ten
miles of Lambert's store. The relationship continued amiably
until the summer of 1981 when Lambert informed Purina that
he planned to sell a competing brand of feed in his store.
Purina's agent initially threatened to terminate Lambert's dealership but later apologized and approved Lambert's plan. Six
months later, however, Purina terminated Lambert's dealership.
Purina claimed that the reason was Lambert's "failure to obtain
market penetration."3 6 Lambert challenged Purina's claim by
demonstrating that he operated3 one of the leading Purina dealerships in the Charleston area. 7
In 1977 Purina, following the advice of its legal counsel, had
established a policy that dealers would not be terminated for
selling competing products. Counsel recommended that other
grounds should be found: grounds such as "failure to achieve
market penetration.13

This policy merely prevented Purina's

32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The operative portion of
the UTPA states: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Id. § 39-520(a).
33. 810 F.2d at 1292-95.
34. "IT]he South Carolina statute is aimed at two distinct kinds of conduct: unfair
or deceptive practices and anticompetitive practices." Id. at 1292. See also Day, The
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping Giant or Illusive Panacea?,33
S.C.L. REV. 479, 480 (1982).
35. 810 F.2d at 1292.
36. Id. at 1291.
37. Record at 46-53.
38. Id. at 77. There is no legal reason for counsel to advise against terminating
dealers who carry competing brands. The Supreme Court has held that exclusive dealing
contracts in which manufacturers restrict dealers from selling competing brands are legal
unless the restrictions exclude a substantial share of the relevant market. Tampa Elec.
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district managers from advising their dealers that selling competing products jeopardized their dealerships. Thus, by terminating Lambert without reasonable notice, Purina denied Lambert an opportunity to choose between selling a competing
brand or continuing to sell Purina products. 9
Lambert sued Purina alleging a violation of the UTPA and
the tort of wrongful termination.40 The United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina directed a verdict in
favor of Purina on the common law wrongful termination
charge. 4 1 The jury returned a verdict for Lambert on the UTPA
claim and assessed actual damages at $78,750. The district court
ruled Purina's violation was willful, trebled the damages, and
awarded Lambert an additional $86,880 in attorney's fees.42
Purina appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court, reasoning that
since the trial court had directed a verdict on Lambert's common law wrongful termination cause of action, the only issue was
anticompetitive practices. 43 Analyzing the alleged anticompetiCo. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961). Exclusive dealing arrangements have
several interbrand, procompetitive effects: (1) the dealer becomes not just a conduit but
an advocate; (2) the dealer is encouraged to invest capital and labor into distribution of
the product; and (3) the manufacturer is apt to provide more assistance to dealers. See
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Roland Mach. Co. v.
Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Beltone Elec. Corp., [1979-1983 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T21,934 (1982); Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in Distribution, 69 CORNELL L, REV. 101, 124-32 (1983).
39. Record at 77.
40. 810 F.2d at 1291. The complaint contained four causes of action: " (1) violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; (2) violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14; (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-5-20; and (4) common-law wrongful termination." Id.
41. The district court determined a wrongful termination claim could not be sustained when the underlying contract was strictly for services. The court further held that
Lambert's contract was strictly for services. Record at 720. Under South Carolina common law, the tort of wrongful termination is limited to those situations in which the
injured party forfeits a substantial investment. See Glaesner v. Beck/Arnley Corp., 790
F.2d 384, 388-89 (4th Cir. 1986). Lambert's outlay was not substantial.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
43. The court stated:
In directing a verdict for Purina on Lambert's common-law wrongful termination claim, the district court found the evidence insufficient to support such a
common-law claim. Necessarily, then, the court also found evidence insufficient
to support an identical claim brought under the label of the Unfair Trade
Like the Federal Trade Commission Act, the South CaroPractices Act ....
lina statute is aimed at two distinct kinds of conduct: unfair or deceptive practices and anticompetitive practices. Only anticompetitive practices are at issue
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tive practices, the court determined that the parties had an exclusive dealing arrangement.44 Under federal law45 exclusive
dealing is a vertical restraint.46 Nonprice vertical restraints are
not violative of federal antitrust laws unless they foreclose competition to a substantial share of the relevant market.47 Courts
employ the "rule of reason" analysis to determine whether a vertical restraint forecloses a substantial share of the market.48 The

Purina court held that, under the "rule of reason" analysis,
Lambert failed to meet his burden of proof.49 In a dissenting

opinion, Judge Sprouse concurred with the majority that the evidence was insufficient to find anticompetitive conduct but argued that Lambert presented enough evidence for a jury to conclude Purina committed an unfair trade practice.5
The Fourth Circuit narrowed the scope of the UTPA by de-

here.
810 F.2d at 1292.
44. Id. at 1293.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976) states:
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph (a) of this section [§ 39-5-20] the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the
Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to § 5(a) (1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
46. 810 F.2d at 1294 n.2.
47. Id. at 1293. Vertical restraints affecting prices, however, are generally per se
illegal. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
48. 810 F.2d at 1294. The following are the elements of the "rule of reason" analysis: (1) a determination of the line of commerce; (2) a demonstration of the geographic
area of effective competition; and (3) a showing that the exclusive dealing excludes a
substantial share of the relevant market. The plaintiff has the burden of proof. Id. at
1293. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Beltone Elec.
Corp., [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) V21,934 at 22, 375, 22,387-95
(1982). See generally Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(in all nonprice vertical restraints, plaintiff must show a significant negative impact on
competition between manufacturers).
49. 810 F.2d at 1295. A court's determination that a plaintiff must hurdle the "rule
of reason" burden of proof is often outcome determinative. See Friedman, Permissible
and Impermissible Vertical Restraints Under the Sherman Antitrust Act: Does "Justice" Care?, 63 DEN. U.L. REv. 127 (1985); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHL L. REv. 6, 15 (1981).
50. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sprouse stated:
The trial court, however, visualized the factual predicate for maintaining the
common law action as separate from that for upholding an action based on the
UTPA. As a result, the court instructed the jury on the necessary factual elements for finding an unfair practice that would violate the statute. The jury
found these facts to exist.
810 F.2d at 1296.
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ciding that the directed verdict on Lambert's wrongful termination claim precluded his claim of unfair practices under the
UTPA 1 Unfair practices under the UTPA are, arguably, much
broader in scope than common law wrongful termination. The
broadest of antitrust laws is the UTPA.5 2 In Bostic Oil v. Michelin 3 the Fourth Circuit reversed a South Carolina district court
for overly restricting the UTPA's scope "to only those practices
which would be unlawful under § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act."'54 The Bostic court speculated that the scope

of UTPA protection extended to South Carolina's definition of
unfair terminations "contrary to equity and good conscience." 55
Under South Carolina common law, contract terminations that
are "contrary to equity and good conscience" are unfair." Accepting Bostic, as Judge Sprouse did in his dissent,57 leads to the
conclusion that the jury's determination should remain
undisturbed.
Other states liberally interpret similar versions of antitrust
statutes. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that "[a]
party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in
conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion of its power
or position."' 8 Massachusetts also broadly defines the term "unfair" under its Regulation of Business Practice and Consumer
Protection Act: "The existence of unfair acts and practices must
be determined from the circumstances of each case."" 9 The
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
52. The Sherman and Clayton Acts form the heart of antitrust regulation. They are
the narrowest in scope. 810 F.2d at 1293. The FTC Act, described as a penumbra around
the federal antitrust statutes, "was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act

and the Clayton Act.. . to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full
blown, would violate those Acts." Federal Trade Comm'n v. Motion Picture Advertising
Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953) (citations omitted). State antitrust statutes compose the third layer of antitrust regulation. The South Carolina UTPA is broader in
scope than the FTC Act. See Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207 (4th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983). UTPA provides protection against unfair
local and private practices while, generally, the FTC Act only has jurisdiction when an
act or practice affects interstate commerce. See Day, supra note 34, at 480 n.7.
53. 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1983).

54. Id. at 1220.
55. Id.
56. deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971).
57. 810 F.2d at 1296.
58. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 264, 266 S.E.2d 610, 622
(1980) (citations omitted).
59. Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 242, 316 N.E.2d 748, 754 (1974).
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Fourth Circuit, therefore, had ample authority to bolster the liberal interpretation of an unfair practice under the UTPA but
elected, instead, to retreat.
The court has overly restricted the definition of an unfair
practice by holding that a dealer's cause of action for an unfair
termination is not actionable unless a wrongful termination
claim can he maintained. 0 The tort of wrongful termination has
limited application in South Carolina: "Courts have found
wrongful termination only in extraordinary circumstances
... ,,ITherefore, outside of extraordinary circumstances,
manufacturers may terminate their dealers, inequitably and in
bad faith, and the UTPA may not provide a method of redress.
In other words, manufacturers have discretion outside the
boundaries of the UTPA to engage in inequitable conduct toward dealers.
The Fourth Circuit's limitation of the definition of unfair
practices under the UTPA to common law wrongful terminations is narrower than the definition of unfair practices under
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act. The Supreme Court
uses three criteria for identification of unfair acts or practices:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to con62
sumers (or competitors or other businessmen).

Often, conduct which is either immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous may not provide a civil claim under the common
law tort of wrongful termination. Therefore, by strictly limiting
the interpretation of an unfair practice, the UTPA scope of protection is narrower than what the FTC Act provides. Such a constriction plainly is offensive to the legislature's intent. The
UTPA specifically directs courts to be guided by the FTC Act

60. 810 F.2d at 1296 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
61. Glaesner v. Beck/Arnley Corp., 790 F.2d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1986).
62. F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972) (emphasis
added).
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and federal interpretations.6 3
The Fourth Circuit has conservatively interpreted the
UTPA in Chuck's Feed & Seed. In recent decisions the Supreme
Court has ruled conservatively when interpreting the federal antitrust laws. 4 Since the South Carolina legislature has directed
courts to look to federal decisions to interpret the UTPA, a conservative trend by the United States Supreme Court should
manifest itself through our state courts' conservative interpretations of South Carolina's UTPA. The Fourth Circuit's method,
however, narrowing the UTPA scope by limiting the UTPA definition of unfair practices to those which would give rise to
wrongful termination claims, is questionable.
If the Fourth Circuit wishes to narrow the UTPA, it might
approach the problem, not by limiting the definition of unfair
practices, but by restricting the standing of the parties. Under
the FTC Act, plaintiffs generally may not bring an action unless
they show that the public would be affected adversely. 5 Since
the UTPA states that courts are to be guided by the FTC Act, it
is logical that the UTPA would restrict claims to those that affect the public. A number of states follow this reasoning.6 Indeed, in Noack Enterprises v. Country Corner Interiors of
Hilton Head Island, Inc6. 7 South Carolina adopted this
reasoning.65
In Chuck's Feed & Seed the Fourth Circuit narrowed the
scope of South Carolina's UTPA. The conservative result, a limitation of the UTPA, parallels recent conservative federal interpretations of federal antitrust laws. The method chosen by the
court, limiting the Act's protection against unfair practices to
those circumstances in which a common law wrongful termination claim could be maintained by the plaintiff, is contrary to
the legislative intent that the FTC Act guide the UTPA. This
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).

64. See Steuer, Exclusive Dealing After Jefferson Parish, 54 ANTITRusT L.J. 1229
(1985).
65. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
66. See Evanston Motor Co. v. Mid-Southern Toyota Distribs., 436 F. Supp. 1370,
1374 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 86, 273 S.E.2d 910, 913-14
(1980).
67. 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986), appeal dismissed, 294 S.C. 235,
363 S.E.2d 688 (1987).
68. See Business Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 39 S.C.L. Ray. 6
(1987).
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limitation is narrower than the protection afforded under the
FTC Act because wrongful termination is an extraordinary tort
in South Carolina. Therefore, the result reached in Chuck's Feed
& Seed, dismissal of the UTPA claim, was correct, but the
method chosen, narrowing the definition of an unfair practice,
was incorrect.
Edwin Lake Turnage

III.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ON REAL ESTATE SALES Do NOT
VIOLATE ANTITRUST ACT

In Fran Welch Real Estate Sales v. Seabrook Island Co. 9
the Fourth Circuit interpreted section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act ° in the context of real estate sales. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Seabrook
Island Company (SIC),7 ' and denied the plaintiff's request for a
preliminary injunction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding
that neither the restrictive covenants prohibiting commercial
signs on Seabrook Island nor the restricted access visitor policy
were unreasonable restraints of trade."2
Seabrook Island Company is the developer of a luxury residential resort on Seabrook Island, a barrier island off the coast
of South Carolina. Much of the success of the resort is attributed to the efforts of SIC and the island's residents to maintain
the island's natural beauty and noncommercial nature. Restrictive covenants prohibit activities or structures, including "For
Sale" and "For Rent" signs, that are inconsistent with the character of the island. Privacy and security are maintained through
a limited visitor-access policy whereby a visitor may gain access
to the island only through a guarded gate and for a suitable,

69. 809 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1987).
70. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
71. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on one
claim that alleged an unlawful tying arrangement when Seabrook Island Company obtained an exclusive listing by a promoter to whom they had sold a tract of land for the
construction of speculative houses. 809 F.2d at 1034.
72. The court also declined to fashion a per se rule for the restriction on commercial signs, stating that they had "no 'considerable experience' with such a restriction."
809 F.2d at 1032 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)).
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specified purpose. Real estate agents who are not employees of
SIC must obtain a pass at the gate house to obtain admission to
the island, and access is limited to three agents from one firm on
the island at one time. SIC sales agents are not subject to the
restrictions imposed on other agents.
Fran Welch Real Estate is a real estate brokerage firm that,
by its own admission,7 3 has been very successful in the property
resale market on Seabrook Island. Fran Welch alleged that the
prohibition of its "For Sale" and "For Rent" signs and the restrictive access policies violated section 1 of the Sherman Anti74
trust Act.
In holding that the ban on "For Sale" and "For Rent" signs
was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, the court emphasized
that the ban was complete and nondiscriminatory, banning
SIC's signs as well as those of Fran Welch. The court found evidence that the motivation behind the sign restriction was purely
aesthetic and that no anticompetitive motive or purpose existed. 75 Finally, the court found that "[i]n the context of the restricted access to the island, there is no basis for an inference
that the prohibition of signs on the properties is
' 76
unreasonable.
In holding that the visitor access policy was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, the court relied on the fact that the
policy was adopted by the property owners association and was
designed to protect the privacy and enhance the security of the
island residents. The court reasoned that since SIC was the island's developer, there was a constant need for its employees to
have access to the island. Furthermore, SIC was able to vouch
for the character and integrity of its employees.77 Therefore, the

73. 809 F.2d at 1031.
74. Welch also alleged that a program, under which SIC would not accept purchaser referrals from brokers who bad listings of Seabrook Property for sale, was a per se
illegal boycott. The Fourth Circuit found that there was "nothing remotely suggesting a
concerted refusal to deal with Fran Welch." 809 F.2d at 1033.
75. The court distinguished Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), on the grounds that the restriction in Cantor was designed to deprive
the plaintiff of his competitive advantage and that no such purpose or motive existed
here. 809 F.2d at 1033.
76. 809 F.2d at 1032.
77. The court also noted that on only one occasion was an agent denied access to
the island, and Fran Welch had apparently lived comfortably with the policy. Id. at
1034.
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court held that since compliance with the rule was only minimally inconvenient, the rule was not an unreasonable restraint
of trade.7"
In determining whether restrictions unreasonably restrain
trade, the Supreme Court has enumerated a number of factors
to be balanced.7 9 The Supreme Court has stated that the proper

focus is "directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions.

80

While the Fourth Circuit did not articu-

late a detailed application of the Supreme Court's factors,""
viewing the decision in the framework of these factors may give
some insight into the scope of the court's holding. The nature of
the business to which the sign restrictions applied presented the
court with a situation in which covenants restricted real estate
signs on a noncommercial resort island. From the emphasis the
court placed on the noncommercial nature of the island, 2 one
can assume that a more in-depth analysis would be required in a
different type of real estate development.
Analysis of the effect and history of the restraints also gives
insight into the scope of the decision. The court was unconvinced that more than a minimal adverse effect was caused by
the restraint," but the court determined that there were adequate means of advertising the property that Fran Welch had
successfully utilized. 4 If a similar restraint were shown to have a
more substantial effect, the court might be more willing to strike
the restraint. Additionally, the fact that the property owners
purchased their property in reliance on the restriction of signs
was important to the trial court 5 and probably influenced the

78. Id.
79. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). These factors
include: the nature of the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition both
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature, effect and history of the restraint;
the evil which it was intended to remedy; the reason for choosing the particular remedy
and the end sought to be achieved. Id. at 238.
80. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978).
81. See supra note 79.
82. The court specifically limited its holding with regard to the sign restrictions to
"the context of the restricted access to the island." 809 F.2d at 1032.
83. The court quoted Fran Welch as boasting that it was competing in the top
group in the number of sales on Seabrook Island. Id. at 1033.
84. Id. at 1032.
85. Fran Welch Real Estate Sales v. Seabrook Island Co., 621 F. Supp. 128, 133-34
(D.S.C. 1985).
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Fourth Circuit as well. Finally, the Fourth Circuit deemed the
end sought to be achieved, maintaining the noncommercial nature of the island, to be legitimate and also determined that the
restriction was adopted for the sole purpose of obtaining this
end. Thus, had there been evidence that the restriction was
adopted for the purpose of reducing competition or for any other
illegitimate purpose, a different ruling may have resulted.
Regarding the restricted access policy, which limited access
to the general public as well as to Fran Welch agents, the court
emphasized that the property owners association adopted the
policy and no illicit purpose was shown.86 The court further emphasized that the policy had caused Fran Welch little inconvenience. Thus, the court implied that neither a total ban on
outside agents nor a policy adopted for an illicit purpose would
be permissible.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit presents a straightforward application of established antitrust principles to a specific
set of facts. The court gave considerable weight to the aesthetic
purpose behind the restrictions, and one could expect the court
to reach a different decision if the same restrictions were applied
to a real estate development lacking a legitimate protectable
environment.
Mark C. Dukes
IV.

PUBLIC INTEREST IMPACT NECESSARY TO RECOVERY UNDER
THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

The South Carolina Court of Appeals once again expressed
the view that for plaintiffs to recover under the South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act 87 (SCUTPA) they must prove that
the unfair or deceptive acts complained of have a sufficient impact on the public interest."" In Key Co. v. Fameco Distribu-

86. The property owners association is independent of the Seabrook Island Company. 809 F.2d at 1032.
87. S.C.CoDE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -560 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
88. For recent South Carolina cases requiring the public interest to be affected to
violate SCUTPA, see Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156 (Ct.
App. 1987); Noack Enter. v. Country Comer Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290
S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347, (Ct. App. 1986), appealdismissed, 294 S.C. 235, 363 S.E.2d 688
(1987).
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tors 9 the court held that an intentional breach of a contract between two corporate parties, without more, does not affect the
public interest and, therefore, does not violate SCUTPA. The
court's reaffirmance of the public interest requirement places
South Carolina in the distinct minority of jurisdictions that have
interpreted unfair trade practices acts."
The plaintiff, Key, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Fameco. The contract provided that Key would place
coin-operated machines in Fameco's nightclub establishment for
a period of eighteen months. The parties agreed to share equally
in the proceeds from these machines.9 1
Several months into the contract, Key began to receive complaints from Fameco concerning the machines. Key's subsequent
investigation revealed that the machines simply had been disconnected.9 2 Key asked Fameco to refrain from unplugging the
machines because repeated disconnecting reduces the life of the
machines. 93 Fameco, however, continued to unplug the video
machines and also moved them to a less visible location in the
bar.9 4 Key determined that Fameco's actions constituted an intentional breach of the contract and, consequently, brought an
action under SCUTPA9
At trial, Fameco made two motions for a directed verdict 8
and a motion for judgment n.o.vY7 on the theory that corporations are not entitled to bring a cause of action under

89. 292 S.C. 524, 357 S.E.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1987).
90. As of 1980, forty-nine states had enacted unfair trade practices acts. Leafier &
Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private
Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence,48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521 (1980). Of
those states that have enacted unfair trade practices acts, only six require the public

interest to be affected for a violation of the act to occur. Hangman Ridge Training v.
SAFECO Title Ins., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). See also Annotation, Practices Forbiddenby State Deceptive Trade Practicesand Consumer ProtectionActs, 89
A.L.R.3D 449 (1979).
91. 292 S.C. at 525, 357 S.E.2d at 477.
92. Id.
93. Record at 7.
94. 292 S.C. at 525-26, 357 S.E.2d at 477.
95. Key Co. claimed that Fameco deliberately unplugged the machines and moved
them to a less visible location to reduce the income that Key Co. should have derived.
Record at 5.
96. Id. at 36, 41.
97. Id. at 42.
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SCUTPA.9 8 These motions were denied, and the jury awarded
the plaintiff $8,000, which the trial court trebled. 9
In reversing the lower court, the court of appeals relied on
Noack Enterprisesv. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head
Island, Inc.,100 which required that the public interest be affected in order to substantiate a claim under SCUTPA.10 1 The
Key court stated that the acts complained of did "not involve
practices that either directly or indirectly affected the rights of
anyone but the contracting parties."1 02 As the public interest
had not been affected, the court concluded that Key Co. had not
1 0°
established a cause of action under SCUTPA.
While the court of appeals has maintained its position re-

quiring the public interest be affected for SCUTPA to be violated, it has not taken the opportunity to articulate a test to
determine what acts affect the public interest. Noack is the sem-

inal case in South Carolina mandating that the public interest
must be affected.10 4 The Noack court, however, made no attempt

to define public interest but merely concluded that the "complaint nowhere alleges any facts demonstrating that these acts
[misrepresentations regarding the sale of a retail business] 1 05 or

98. The defendant argued that the intent of SCUTPA was to protect consumers;
therefore, consumers were the only parties allowed to bring claims under SCUTPA. As
Key is a corporation of the state of South Carolina, it is not a consumer and, hence,
cannot maintain an action under SCUTPA. Record at 36.
99. 292 S.C. at 525, 357 S.E.2d at 477. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op.
1976 & Supp. 1987) provides that a court may treble the damages of a successful plaintiff
who has suffered an ascertainable loss because of a violation of SCUTPA.
100. 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986).
101. For a detailed analysis of Noack and the public interest requirement, see Business Law, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 39 S.C.L. REv. 6 (1987).
102. 292 S.C. at 526, 357 S.E.2d at 478.
103. Id.
104. The Noack court stated that although SCUTPA created a private right of action pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976), the private action
must serve the same objective and be similarly restricted in scope as an action brought
by the attorney general. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976) authorizes the
attorney general to bring an action in the name of the state to enjoin unfair trade practices when to do so would be in the public interest. The private plaintiff's claim, therefore, must affect the public interest. 290 S.C. at 477, 351 S.E.2d at 347. See also Business
Law, supra note 101.
105. The seller of this retail establishment was not in the business of selling retail
establishments. If the defendant had been in the business of selling retail establishments, the actions might have been held to violate SCUTPA. See Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1987).
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practices adversely affect the public." '
The court of appeals shed some light on what constitutes
"affecting the public interest" in Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet
Co.'0 7 In Barnes the plaintiff, claiming the defendant had "padded" his automobile repair bill, brought an action under
SCUTPA. The court concluded that unfair or deceptive acts
with the potential for repetition have an impact on the public.'
The repair shop has the potential to "pad" the bills of other
customers; therefore, this type of conduct violates SCUTPA.
The "potential for repetition" test is the most specific the
court of appeals has been on the public interest issue. Additionally, it is difficult to examine other jurisdictions for persuasive
value in defining "public interest" because no state has a statute
worded exactly like South Carolina's, 0 9 and few states even require an impact on public interest.110 Only Washington and
Georgia have made attempts to promulgate tests to determine
public interest."'
1 2
In Hangman Ridge Training v. SAFECO Title Insurance
the Washington Supreme Court stated that the trier of fact
must determine public interest from several factors, depending
upon the context in which the alleged acts were committed." 3
The factors for determining public interest differ for acts committed in a consumer transaction context and for those committed in a private dispute. The relevant factors to establish a public interest in the consumer context include:
1) Whether the alleged acts were committed in the course
of defendant's business?
2) Whether the acts were part of a pattern or generalized
course of conduct?

106. 290 S.C. at 480, 351 S.E.2d at 350.

107. 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1987).
108. Id. at 613, 358 S.E.2d at 160.
109. 290 S.C. at 477, 351 S.E.2d at 349.
110. See supra note 90.
111. Other jurisdictions requiring a public interest have not provided a useful
framework for evaluating this issue. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 590 F.
Supp. 1083, 1087 (N.D. ll. 1984) (the "public interest" requirement has not been uniformly applied in Illinois); see also Genesco Entertainment, a Div. of Lymutt, Inc. v.
Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ai v. Frank Huff Agency, Ltd., 61 Haw. 607, 607
P.2d 1304 (1980).
112. 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
113. Id. at 789-90, 719 P.2d at 537.
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3) Whether repeated acts were committed prior to the act
involving the plaintiff?
4) Whether there is a real and substantial potential for
repetition of defendant's conduct after the act involving
plaintiff?
5) Whether the act complained of involved a single
transaction?
6) Whether many consumers were affected, or likely to be
affected, by it?""
Where the context is essentially a private dispute," 5 the factors
indicating a public interest are the following:
1) Whether the acts were committed in the course of defendant's business?
2)Whether defendant advertised to the general public?
3) Whether defendant actively solicited this particular
plaintiff, indicating potential soliciting of others?
4) Whether the plaintiff and defendant occupied unequal
bargaining positions?"'
The court further stated that these factors, as applied in
both the consumer- and private-dispute contexts, are merely indicia of a public interest, and none are dispositive, 7
The Hangman Ridge court also stated that the public interest element may be satisfied per se. The per se method requires
a showing that defendant's conduct violated a statute that contains a specific legislative declaration stating that the proscribed
conduct is against the public interest." 8
Georgia courts also have promulgated a framework to determine public interest with respect to a violation of their state's
analogue to the SCUTPA. In Benchmark Carpet Mills v. Fiber
Industries"9 the defendant counterclaimed under the Georgia
Deceptive Trade Practices Act 2 0 for an intentional cancellation

114. Id. at 790, 719 P.2d at 538.
115. Examples given of a private dispute are attorney-client, insurer-insured, realtor-property purchaser, and escrow closing agent-client. Id.
116. Id. at 790-91, 719 P.2d at 538.
117. The Washington Supreme Court has conceded that the distinction between a
private dispute and a consumer transaction is sometimes difficult to ascertain. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tamprurious, 107 Wash. 2d 735, 733 P.2d 208 (1987).
118. 105 Wash. 2d at 791, 719 P.2d at 538.
119. 168 Ga. App. 932, 311 S.E.2d 216 (1983).
120. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370 to -426 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
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of a yarn contract. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff
knew it would not be able to fill the contract at the time of execution. The court held that no recovery could be had under the
act as the "allegedly offensive activity must have taken place in
the conduct of ... consumer acts or practices, i.e., within the
context of the consumer marketplace. '121 The court's two-step

analysis to determine impact on the public interest focuses on:
1) the medium through which the act or practice is introduced
into the stream of commerce and 2) the market on which the act
or practice is reasonably intended to impact.122 The court illustrated the application of this test by stating that if the deceptive
act, such as advertising, were addressed to the consuming public,
the act would be violated.123 If the advertising, however, was
limited to a nonconsumer market, such as professional journals,
the conduct would be outside the scope of the act even though a
public medium was used. 24
Although South Carolina courts have not stated explicitly
what constitutes a public interest, the policy behind this construction of SCUTPA is to limit the broad range of recovery
that may have been possible. 25 One commentator points out
that "[c]onservative state courts might resist such a potential
revolutionary cause of action.

' 126

While the legislature did not

avoid enacting the SCUTPA, the court of appeals has limited
the potential broad coverage of the act, fearing a proliferation of

121. 168 Ga. App. at 933, 311 S.E.2d at 218. This analysis is similar to the argument

that the defendant advanced in Key at trial. The defendant, relying on Benchmark and
Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), argued that SCUTPA did not
provide protection to the plaintiff corporation, which is presumed to be a sophisticated

purchaser. Brief of Appellant at 6. The trial court seemed to agree with the defendant
that SCUTPA does not apply to sophisticated corporations since the court stated that it

did not think that "General Motors could sue Toyota ... under the Unfair Trade Practices Act." Record at 38. The court, however, decided that because the plaintiff was a
small family corporation, it was not precluded from suing under SCUTPA. Record at 34.
122. 168 Ga. App. at 934, 311 S.E.2d at 218.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The wording of most unfair trade practices acts is so broad and pervasive that
many have been constitutionally challenged on grounds of vagueness. See, e.g., State v.
O'Neil Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980); Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 72 Ill. 2d 179, 380 N.E.2d 790 (1978); State v. Reader's Digest Assoc., 81
Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
126. Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade PracticesAct: Sleeping Giant or Illusive Panacea?,33 S.CL. REv. 479, 487 (1980).
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litigation would result because of successful plaintiffs' ability to
128
collect treble damages1 27 and attorney's fees.

The practitioner may find it beneficial to rely on Hangman
Ridge and Benchmark for guidance as to what constitutes a
public interest. It is impossible, however, to predict what direction the court may take in defining public interest. Attorneys
should stay abreast of developments regarding SCUTPA, as the
court of appeals seems to be taking an ad hoc approach to the
public interest issue. SCUTPA, which at one time appeared to
be a valuable plaintiff's tool, has been gutted by recent court of
appeals decisons. 29 These decisons seem to have answered Professor Day's question of whether SCUPTA is a "[s]leeping giant
or [i]llusive panacea."130

Alan M. Lipsitz

127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
128. Id.
129. But see Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 90, at 557 (predicting the expansive future uses of state unfair trade practices acts).
130. Day, supra note 126, at 479.
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